Any peer-to-peer network must face the threat of active attacks against the
network by some of the peers. One of the most vulnerable areas of
cooperation is the sharing of metadata. Sharing of metadata is particularly
susceptible to attack because metadata (for example, the authorship of a
work of art, the keywords used to index a text, or an opinion of the beauty
of a piece of music) is often impossible to verify for "correctness"
automatically. Attackers have already initiated "metadata poisoning" attacks
against many of the peer to peer networks, for example by uploading mp3
files marked as being copies of popular songs, but containing instead a
recording of a chainsaw or of an anti-piracy lecture.
We introduce "attack resistance" -- a measure of the robustness of a network
in the face of active attacks by some of its peers -- as applied to systems
for metadata sharing, and propose a novel protocol for sharing arbitrary
metadata across a network while ensuring this property. In addition to
attack resistance, the proposed protocol exhibits other desirable
characteristics, such as respecting the presence of diverse opinions, and
discovering well-recommended but little-known songs ("diamonds in the
rough").
The metadata sharing protocol is only one example of a general class of
flow-bounded trust networks, a class which includes the Advogato trust
metric. An experimental implementation is underway on the Mojo Nation peer-to-peer network.